On Kant and Enlightenment

Kant outlines his position on what Enlightenment is in his essay, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment, stating that Enlightenment is “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity;” essentially a growing up and a choice to think for one’s self in accordance with reason as an end-in-itself. Moreover, that there are two distinct categories of reason – public and private – and though Kant states that only unrestricted public reason is needed to achieve Enlightenment, he also argues the need for both elements of reason to exist for there to be Enlightenment. In response I contend that Kant makes a category error in the operative description of reason, leading to unnecessary preconditionals for the success of the Enlightenment. And that by including Aristotle’s definition of Man and Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch, it may be possible to achieve Kant’s definition of Enlightenment without the need for authority, nor obedience in any form other than to reason itself; in essence, a type of neo-Enlightenment.

It was in response to a question posed in an article by Reverend Johann Friedrich Zöllner that Kant wrote his essay. In the footnote Zöllner asked: “What is Enlightenment?” Further stating that: “This question, which is nearly as important as ‘What is truth?’ should be answered before one begins to enlighten.” (Kuehn & Klemme 2010) In responding, Kant outlines his reflections on the Enlightenment and defines it as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.” And by immaturity he means “a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for.” (Foucault 1978) Essentially for Kant, it is our willingness to think for ourselves and not rely on others, which is the hallmark of enlightenment. Kant gives three examples where we fail to think for ourselves: books for knowledge; religion for morality; dieticians for nutrition. Each highlighting a distinct form that subordination takes when accepting authority over one’s own ability to reason. Moreover, Kant not only implores the value of reason, he also argues that we use reason operatively differently depending on the domain in which we find ourselves in. (i.e. public and private)

Private reason is the type conducted in accordance with one’s civic duty, whether in political office, law, or within a workspace; it is reasoning we use as a cog in a larger system which is constructed toward a given aim or outcome. In contrast, public reason is the type conducted in a scholarly manner before the entire literate world with intent to improve both the civic and personal areas of our lives. Moreover private reason has limits imposed on it unlike public reasoning. For instance, when working for a company we are employed to fill a need and as such our use of reason is limited to the domain of that need; it is a practical form of reason dictated by the employer. Whereas, outside that employment and within the public domain we may question without limit all areas; this is a scholarly form of reason. Furthermore, Kant states that private use of reason may be restricted without hindering enlightenment, but that public use of reason must always be free and unlimited and that it alone can bring about Enlightenment. (Kant 1784)

The reason for this inequality is due to reasons relationships within the domain it operates within: private reason operates in subordination to its domain, the civic space; whereas, public reason is its own domain and subordinate only to itself. According to Kant, if private reason was not subordinate to its domain it could lead to civic instability. For instance the mail man might stop delivering mail, reasoning that people only send mail out of emotional need which they can live without; or that advertising manipulates people to buy things they don’t necessarily need or want and therefore isn’t necessary to send. For Kant, the potentially damaging effect of reasoning without limit in such a civic role is cause enough to demand private reasoning always be subordinate to its domain. Whereas in contrast, he thinks that unlimited and free use of public reason can only ever lead to the bettering of society, that it is only when it is hindered or controlled that it can succumb to error or prejudice, this is because of its domain being subverted from itself and used as a means to a end other than its own; which is precisely what befell the French Revolution and the Enlightenment ideals from whence it came.

Additionally, Kant argues that for Enlightenment to succeed there must be certain preconditionals to ensure a stable environment for which reason can be used freely, and ideas can be shared and tested. To this end he proposes that a contract between citizens and a state leader who would ensure freedom to reason in return for obedience. In his own words:

“Only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace can say what no republic may dare, namely: argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!”

(Kant 1784)

This solution outlined by Kant can be thought of as a form of “rational despotism with free reason” (Foucault 1978, p. 4). In other words, Kant is asking for obedience for freedom to reason. However, there are problems which arise from Kant’s solutions.

There seems to be a logical inconsistency within Kant’s use of power and reason with freedom and obedience. It is not clear how exactly an enlightened ruler would secure free and unhindered use of public reason indefinitely and without contradiction. There is a contradiction in obedience and use of reason without limit; especially as Kant outlines that one’s public use of reason cannot be subordinate to anything other than its own end, and in this case it would be subordinate to power through the act of obedience. What happens if reason leads us from this state of obedience, demanding that we disobey? Power is built on obedience, and demands further obedience for its constancy. Whereas reason is built on reason, only requires freedom to reason, leading to further freedoms in its own name.

Plato states that it does not do “someone any good to live with his body in misery [as] the inevitable outcome is a miserable life.” (Plato p. 101) And just as ignoring sickness in a part of our body threatens the health of our self as a whole, so too does ignoring sickness threaten the health of society. And as Aristotle states in his Nicomachean Ethics, the end of medicine is the health of the body. Similarly the end of Enlightenment is the health of society. Hence, just as we require medicine to heal us when we are sick, so that we may exercise our will and live our lives; so too does society require enlightenment to heal it so that it better represents those from whom it is made. When we are healthy we are fit and able; when society is healthy it is enlightened. Essentially, we can think of the public realm as a product of our humanity, a reflection of us, of our souls and of our will. Whereas the private realm is best compared to our body, necessary but subordinate to our will.

Subsequently, it is by distinguishing between public and private domains that reason is left vulnerable and the Enlightenment doomed to fail as history has shown. The reason for this is the inherently unenlightened principles that govern the private domain, which is built on politics, commerce and industry, and is ruled by greed and power. Essentially, business and politics are impersonal exercises: businesses aim for profit; politics aims for power. In contrast, we can think of the public domain as a product of our humanity, a reflection of us, of our souls and of our will. Whereas the private domain is best compared to our body; being necessary and subordinate to us and our will. Hence, if we reject Kant’s categories of reason we can also do away with his need for obedience, leaving the only remaining issue the fear of civic collapse due to free use of reason.

However, I think this is a false fear that has been instilled within us as a means to prevent change, the same type of fear Kant refers to regarding the “guardians.” Ultimately, that “this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times [we] would certainly in the end learn to walk.” (Kant 1784) And like Kant’s false fear, this civic fear is so engrained into man’s psyche that he is essentially debilitated by it. Perhaps even Kant himself would willingly offer obedience to a ruler in order to guarantee civic safety through the presence and threat of a great army. This seems like a blunt and contrary solution if Enlightenment is his aim

In order to get to an Enlightenment that fits Kant’s definition all that may be necessary is the use of Aristotle’s definition of man, along with Nietzsche’s conception of the Übermensch, in accordance with Kant’s description of public reason used without restriction at all times across all domains. Aristotle defines man as a rational animal (Aristotle & Ross 1981), while Nietzsche’s Übermensch is Man having overcome weakness and lack of will to utilise his creative element toward earthly and life affirming acts. (Nietzsche 2012) And, by Kant’s own admission, all that is needed for Enlightenment to succeed is free use of public reason without restriction. Therefore, if we abandon Kant’s preconditions for obedience and reason without limit then Enlightenment must be secured; and even if the civic were to collapse the nietzschean man would adapt and Enlightenment would simply continue on its trajectory of enlightening. In this solution there is no need for categories of reason as reason is inherent in man’s nature as described by Aristotle. Essentially, there are no preconditionals beyond the need for reason. This is neo-enlightenment with no fixed direction and no planned outcome beyond Man fulfilling his nature to reason.

Finally, while I agree with Kant’s definition of Enlightenment and his description of categories of reason, I disagree with his preconditionals for the success of Enlightenment as Kant makes a category error regarding reasons operative description that leads to a contradiction. All reason needs to succeed is the freedom to reason; whereas power demands obedience for its constancy. Ultimately, Kant’s reflections are historical in nature and therefore it is history by which they are tested. And that through Aristotle’s definition of Man as a reasoning animal, and Nietzsche’s concept of Man beyond his reliance on authority and otherworldliness, that fear of civic collapse is surely a false one.

In all, abandonment of authority and tradition as valid means of knowledge will be difficult, even destructive, but it is by dismantling that we gain opportunities to rebuild. Kant’s version of Enlightenment is individualistic, requiring preconditionals to reach humanity as a whole; whereas with addition of Aristotle’s definition of Man and Nietzsche’s view of a fully self actualised Man, a societal level neo-Enlightenment, where reason par excellence is the means, in and of itself may be possible. While this is not the Enlightenment Kant set out to describe it could very well lead to the bettering of Man which Kant was hoping for.

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