On Knowing That and Knowing How

Propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that, has a reversible quality to it. Meaning, that by having propositional knowledge of something, I can create further examples of this kind by means of counterfactuals that are negations of the original proposition. Simply put, if I know something-is, then I am also able to know by inference what it is-not. If I know what a chair is, by definition I am also capable of knowing what a chair is not.

Essentially, we really know the chair by limit of what can entail its existence, not just necessarily by its own actuality. Knowledge in this ascriptive sense can be thought of as acquaintance by means of negation. Therefore, if we know something we can infer further meaningful counterfactual propositions from it.

Example

1

I know what a chair is

2

A chair is not a bicycle

∴

Therefore I know what a bicycle is not

Whereas knowledge of the form ‘knowledge-how’ does not appear to conform to this ascription of knowledge as acquaintance by means of negation. Nor does it appear to allow the creation of further examples of its own kind by means of counter-example, as propositional knowledge seems to. If I know how to ride a bicycle I cannot therefore infer further examples of the kind ‘know-how’ by way of counter-factual.

Example

1

I can ride a bicycle

2

A bicycle is not a plane

∴

Therefore I know I cannot fly a plane

Moreover, interestingly, it seems that with propositional knowledge we are able to know more things that are not than know things that are. Meaning, the set of things that-is-not-a-chair is larger than the set of things that-is-a-chair. There doesn’t appear to be a limit on how many further counterfactuals can be drawn from any original proposition, apart from an ontological one; demarcating between meaningful ones that exist, and non meaningful ones that don’t.

In addition, propositions appear to be standalone facts, ideas, concepts, which can be understood on their own, and known by their relation to the world. Whereas the knowledge of how to do something, say riding a bike, requires more than just the formal description of the action to be fully understood in the extended sense of knowing how to do the act oneself.

For instance, one can easily understand and know the function and structure of a chair by nothing more than its proper definition, requiring no further information or additional experience of the chair itself; this understanding would be complete. Whereas to define how one rides a bike in the complete sense, an additional experience component is necessary. A purely definitional description of the act will not be sufficient in someone knowing themselves how to ride a bike.

Example

1

A chair is a piece of furniture designed to accommodate one sitting or reclining person, providing support for the back and often the arms and typically standing on four legs.

2

One rides a bicycle by sitting on the seat, creating forward movement by rotating the pedals through a circular up-down motion with ones feet and legs, while steering by controlling the handlebars with both hands, and maintaining balance by opposite incremental body movements in response and anticipation of the bikes movement.

Prima facie, the difference between [1] and [2] appears obvious: while both definitions rely on further circumstantial facts to be understood, riding a bike is not something that can be known by fact alone as it requires the additional experience of the act itself. Simply put, to hold knowledge of how to ride a bike requires a further doing component.